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巴曙松教授,博士,国务院发展研究中心金融研究所副所长,研究员,博士生导师,享受国务院特殊津贴。    巴曙松教授在银行、证券、基金、企业年金等领域有过10余年的实践工作经验,熟悉商业银行风险管理、基金与年金运作,参与中银香港海外重组上市项目,主持起草了《中银香港风险管理政策与流程》。目前的主要研究领域为金融机构风险管理与金融市场监管、企业融资问题与货币政策决策,出版了国内第一本系统研究巴塞尔新资本协议的《巴塞尔新资本协议研究》(中国金融出版社2003年版)

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罗奇在金融时报撰文:反对伯南克继任  

2009-08-26 11:54:01|  分类: 默认分类 |  标签: |举报 |字号 订阅

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Excerpt:
It is as if a doctor guilty of malpractice is being given creditfor inventing a miracle cure. Maybe the patient needs a newdoctor.
 
Mr Bernanke made three critical mistakes in his pre-Lehmanincarnation
·       First, and foremost, he was deeply wedded to the philosophicalconviction that central banks should be agnostic when it comes toasset bubbles
·        Second, Mr Bernanke was the intellectual champion of the “globalsaving glut” defence that exonerated the US from its bubble-pronetendencies and pinned the blame on surplus savers in Asia. […] MrBernanke’s saving glut argument was at the core of a deep-seated USdenial that failed to look in the mirror and pinned blame onothers.
·        Third, Mr Bernanke is cut from the same market libertarian cloththat got the Fed into this mess
 
Notwithstanding these mistakes, Mr Obama may be premature in givingMr Bernanke credit for the great cure. No one knows for certain asto whether the Fed’s strategy will ultimately be successful.
 
There is still good reason to believe that the US recovery will beanaemic and fragile.
 
Yes, he reacted strongly after the fact in taking actions to avoidthe pitfalls highlighted by his own research. But he lacked theforesight and courage to resist the most reckless tendencies of theera of excess.
 
 
The case against Bernanke
By Stephen Roach
 
FT, Published: August 25 2009 16:02 |
Barack Obama has rendered one of his most important post-crisisverdicts: Ben Bernanke will be nominated for a second term aschairman of the Federal Reserve. This is a very shortsighteddecision. While America’s head central banker deserves credit forbeing creative and courageous in orchestrating an unusuallyaggressive monetary easing programme, it is important to rememberthat his pre-crisis actions played an equally critical role insetting the stage for the most wrenching recession since the 1930s.It is as if a doctor guilty of malpractice is being given creditfor inventing a miracle cure. Maybe the patient needs a newdoctor.
 
Mr Bernanke made three critical mistakes in his pre-Lehmanincarnation: First, and foremost, he was deeply wedded to thephilosophical conviction that central banks should be agnostic whenit comes to asset bubbles. On this count, he stood with hispredecessor – serial bubble-blowing Alan Greenspan – who arguedthat monetary authorities are best positioned to clean up the messafter the bursting of asset bubbles rather than to pre-empt thedamage. As a corollary to this approach, both Mr Bernanke and MrGreenspan drew the wrong conclusions from post-bubble strategiesearlier in this decade put in place after the bursting of theequity bubble in 2000. In retrospect, the Fed’s injection of excessliquidity in 2001-2003, which Mr Bernanke endorsed with fervour,played a key role in setting the stage for the lethal mix ofproperty and credit bubbles.
 
Second, Mr Bernanke was the intellectual champion of the “globalsaving glut” defence that exonerated the US from its bubble-pronetendencies and pinned the blame on surplus savers in Asia. Whilethere is no denying the demand for dollar assets by foreigncreditors, it is absurd to blame overseas lenders for recklessbehaviour by Americans that a US central bank should havecontained. Asia’s surplus savers had nothing to do with America’sirresponsible penchant for leveraging a housing bubble and usingthe proceeds to fund consumption. Mr Bernanke’s saving glutargument was at the core of a deep-seated US denial that failed tolook in the mirror and pinned blame on others.
 
Third, Mr Bernanke is cut from the same market libertarian cloththat got the Fed into this mess. Steeped in the Greenspan credothat markets know better than regulators, Mr Bernanke was alignedwith the prevailing Fed mindset that abrogated its regulatoryauthority in the era of excess. The derivatives’ explosion, extremeleverage of regulated and shadow banks and excesses of mortgagelending were all flagrant abuses that both Mr Bernanke and MrGreenspan could have said no to. But they did not. As a result, acomplex and unstable system veered dangerously out ofcontrol.
 
Notwithstanding these mistakes, Mr Obama may be premature in givingMr Bernanke credit for the great cure. No one knows for certain asto whether the Fed’s strategy will ultimately be successful. Theworst of the US recession appears to have been arrested for now – afairly typical, but temporary, outgrowth of the time-honouredinventory cycle. But the sustainability of any post-bubble recoveryis always dubious. Just ask Japan 20 years after the bursting ofits bubbles.
 
While financial markets are giddy with hopes of economic revival –in part inspired by Mr Bernanke’s cheerleading at the Fed’s annualJackson Hole gathering – there is still good reason to believe thatthe US recovery will be anaemic and fragile. US consumers are inthe early stages of a multi-year retrenchment as they cut debt andrebuild retirement saving. The unusual breadth and synchronicity ofthe global recession will restrain US export demand from becoming anew growth engine.
 
It would be the height of folly to reward Mr Bernanke for therecovery that never stuck. Yet Mr Bernanke’s apparent reward is,unfortunately, typical of the snap judgments that guide Washingtondecision-making. In this same vein, it is hard to forget MrGreenspan’s mission-accomplished speech in 2004 that claimed “ourstrategy of addressing the bubble’s consequences rather than thebubble itself has been successful”. Eager to declare the crisisover, the Obama verdict may be equally premature.
 
The Bernanke reappointment is a welcome chance for a broader debateover the conduct and role of US monetary policy. Mr Obama has madesweeping proposals that give the Fed broad new powers in managingsystemic risks. I argued in the Financial Times 10 months ago thatthe Fed should not be granted these powers without greateraccountability as required by a “financial stability mandate” – ineffect, forcing the Fed to shape monetary policy with an aimtowards avoiding asset bubbles and imbalances. Without a revampedpolicy mandate, it is conceivable that we could face anotherdestabilising crisis.
 
Ultimately, these decisions boil down to the person – in this case,Mr Bernanke – who is being charged with the awesome responsibilityas America’s chief economic policymaker. As a student of the GreatDepression, he should have known better. Yes, he reacted stronglyafter the fact in taking actions to avoid the pitfalls highlightedby his own research. But he lacked the foresight and courage toresist the most reckless tendencies of the era of excess. The worldneeds central bankers who avoid problems, not those who specialisein post-crisis damage control. For that reason, alone, he shouldnot be reappointed. Let the debate begin.
 
The writer is chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and author of TheNext Asia to be published next month
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